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Because it is the area of civil law with a distinctly human face, students 
often initially find tort law accessible; sometimes deceptively so. Early on, 
they are introduced to the importance of policy in the development of case 
law. Often this policy is not articulated, so a skill must be developed of 
reading between the lines, in order to discern the influence upon judicial 
decision-making of concerns such as those about the ‘floodgates’, or perhaps 
defensive practice. But additionally, both students, their teachers and users of 
the tort system, must be appraised that explicit assertions about ‘policy’ are 
premised upon much more fundamental and elusive assumptions about the 
way society does or should operate.  
When these assumptions are gender-based, it is contended, women using 
the tort system are frequently disadvantaged on both an individual and 
collective basis; and this is all the more serious because of the insidious 
means of operation. This collection of writings by prominent feminist tort 
scholars from around the common law world sets out to expose, explore and 
criticise these hidden gendered underpinnings across a spectrum of torts from 
negligence, through personal torts such as rape, on to novel ways of looking at 
privacy and nuisance law. 
The ‘feminist perspectives’ of the title must be clearly identified if the 
collection is to be assessed on its own terms. For Joanne Conaghan, the 
feminist legal endeavour is: ‘first and foremost to bring a gendered perception 
of legal and social arrangements to bear upon a largely gender-neutral 
understanding of them’ (p 14). When aspects of the legal system apparently 
ignore or under-value 50% of the population, a message is being sent to the 
wider society. 
In addition to the dissection of gendered perceptions, the other key critical 
stance pursued by the contributors is the feminist view of the world, and thus 
law, in relational terms; that is human connectedness and interaction. 
Arguably, the tort system itself is premised on an individualistic or atomistic 
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model of harm and of remedy; but damage can be visited upon a community, 
as in nuisance cases, and a collective response may often be more 
empowering for the vulnerable in society, among whom there will be a strong 
female representation. Conaghan asserts that where, ‘tort law, as traditionally 
presented, presupposes the essential separateness of individuals from each 
other, feminist perspectives recognise, from the very outset, our necessary 
connectedness’ (p 66). 
Some contributions focus on particular torts: negligence, nuisance, 
privacy, or trespass to the person. But they all contain, to some degree, 
analyses of gendered conceptions of harm and their consequent impact on 
both development of tort doctrine and the calculation of damages. Negligence, 
and its fundamental component duty of care is an obvious starting point, with 
Jennifer Steele examining the strengths and weaknesses of current judicial 
approaches. She elucidates the way in which individualist rhetoric has 
influenced the inevitable line-drawing, which abstract conceptions of duty of 
care require. Carol Gilligan’s seminal ideas on moral psychology and her 
feminine ‘ethic of care’ support Steele in her advocacy of a more relational 
and contextual approach to duty. 
In ‘Endgame: On Negligence and Reparation for Harm’ Nicky Priaulx 
explores historical assumptions that determine how harm is conceptualised for 
the purposes of damages calculation. She posits a form of ‘psycho-social’ or 
hybrid damage - not generally compensable due to the ‘bright line’ which has 
favoured physical injury in order to restrict the spread of negligence, (with 
narrow exceptions for serious psychiatric injury). Too often, damage suffered 
by women, whether emotional or related to reproduction, is consigned the 
category of mere ‘vicissitudes of life’, which are not compensable. The 
evolution of duty of care is characterised by incrementalism; which, while 
bringing a degree of equality within the tort system, can also be criticised as 
somewhat arbitrary. 
Her argument goes much farther, however, and she casts doubt upon the 
whole ‘damage principle’. Stepping outside of the tort system, which ‘reaches 
a rather small (and privileged) community of injured beneficiaries’ (p 45), 
Priaulx questions the contribution of negligence law to humanity. She 
reappraises the ‘taken-for-granted’ notion that physical injury is ‘especially 
harmful’ (author’s italics). When research on hedonic psychology indicates 
that people often adapt to misfortune, including the physical, should we 
consistently regard disability in only negative terms? Ultimately, she suggests 
that lack of consensus over where to draw boundaries to the reach of 
negligence could lead to ‘a no-win situation in attempting to establish a fair 
and inclusive means of providing redress for harm’ (p 51). 
Dayna Nadine Scott investigates a case, novel for many British readers, 
where public nuisance led to collective harm in a Canadian First Nation 
community. In an industrial area of the Great Lakes, known as ‘Chemical 
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Valley’, environmental contamination by endocrine-disrupting chemicals 
(‘gender benders’) were said to have led to a dramatic drop in the birth of 
males. Additionally to the causal hurdles to be surmounted, environmental 
activists supporting the legal actions were aware that skewed sex ratio was 
novel and problematic category of damage. As with that discussed by Priaulx, 
the harm is intangible, or ‘incorporeal’. This was reproductive harm suffered 
at a collective level; though additionally there were individual health 
problems within the aboriginal community. While tort law is founded on the 
assumption of the separateness of individuals, ‘all living things are embedded 
and interwoven into larger webs of being’ (p 55), never more so than in the 
process of reproduction. The case is a paradigm of feminist relationality. Also 
evident here, as in many environmental cases, are issues of racial and class 
equality. Scott quotes a mantra: ‘some of us live more downstream than 
others’(p 58). Again, fundamental givens are challenged, as she points out that 
once damage is conceived not at the ‘cellular’ but ‘community level’, we must 
also radically re-think what providing a remedy for this injury would actually 
entail. Would ‘loss of a chance’ be applicable? Sadly, it is possible to mention 
only a handful of the disturbing dilemmas presented by Scott. 
In her contribution on police negligence, Kirsty Horsey interrogates the 
long-standing immunity of the police from claims for negligence in the 
function of crime prevention and investigation. Assumptions underpinning the 
policy arguments in cases ranging from Hill v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire,
1
 to Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,
2
 are challenged. Her 
references are extensive and informative, including the details of many 
Independent Police Complaints Commission investigations as well as 
comparisons with Canada, where a duty to warn rape victims was recognised 
in Doe v Met Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police.
3
 Not for the 
first time in this collection, an author acknowledges the potential clash of 
differing feminist perspectives. What is being lost or compromised if all 
females are regarded as inherently vulnerable and thereby in need of extra 
protection from the police? The title of Horsey’s piece, ‘Police Negligence, 
Invisible Immunity and Disadvantaged Claimants’ accurately reflects that the 
issues involved in this developing area range far beyond those of gender.  
In ‘Drug Products Liability Actions and Women’s Health’ Patricia Peppin 
describes biases which impact on women as consumers of pharmaceuticals in 
their reproductive life. She presents as vivid ‘lessons from mass tort litigation’ 
three products which impacted directly upon women: thalidomide, the Dalkon 
Shield and Diethystilbestrol (DES). They illustrate the profound harm done to 
women and their children by inadequate testing and cavalier marketing, harm 
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compounded by the inability of the tort system to provide adequate 
recompense. It was revealing to consider the possible effects of bias in drug 
advertising, where women are overrepresented as patients requiring 
psychiatric drugs and under-represented as cardio-vascular patients (except in 
the carer role). The instilled ‘diagnostic image’ may then unconsciously bias 
practitioners, so that they are prone to over-diagnose psychiatric illness in 
women, but fail to recognise cardio-vascular symptoms which, to complicate 
matters, do not conform to those of males. When pharmaceuticals are tested 
and marketed, the default patient is taken to be the adult male. The resultant 
knowledge deficit puts women at risk from being treated with inadequately 
tested drugs. One key demographic which is excluded from clinical trials are 
of course pregnant women, but no viable alternative is suggested. Peppin 
concludes that ‘…feminist activists may drive the movement for social 
change’(p 122). However, it must be not be forgotten that elderly men (and 
women), as well as children, continue to be regarded as ‘therapeutic orphans’ 
in relation to the drugs industry. 
The standard of care of in negligence is the topic of Miola’s contribution, 
in which he reviews the post-Bolitho
4
 application of the common law’s Bolam 
test.
5
 He sees the main issue as one of paternalism from the medical 
profession; often more related to power than gender. But because those at the 
top of the medical profession are more likely to be male, and patients are 
frequently female, Miola endorses Conaghan’s concept of ‘gendered harms’ 
which are ‘not exclusive to females in any biological sense [but which] are 
risks women are more likely to incur’ due to male violence and reproductive 
intervention. Natural empathy between male judges and male doctors 
reinforce this paternalism. Will gradual ‘feminisation’ of the medical 
profession (with women making up 60% of new applicants) lead to 
differences in the application of the ‘reasonableness’ test for standard of care? 
It is concluded that very gradually, cases such as Chester v Afshar,
6
 indicate 
the patient perspective is gaining ground. The lack an evidential base for some 
of his key assertions is disquieting in an otherwise illuminating discourse on 
the current state of the case law. 
In her chapter, ‘If I Cannot Have Her Everybody Can’, Janice Richardson 
traces the development of privacy law leading to the growing number of 
sexual disclosure cases. These include revelation to the press of sexual 
activity (Max Mosley v News Group Newspapers
7
), and the technologically-
enabled spreading of (usually hetero-) sexual imagery. She begins by 
exploring four different theories of privacy: non-intrusion (Warren and 
                                                     
4
 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. 
5
 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
6
 [2005] AC 134. 
7
 [2008] EWHC 1777. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
269 
Brandeis’s ‘right to be let alone’), seclusion (physical), limitation (secrecy) 
and control (autonomy over use of private information). They provide the 
bases for trying to understand both motivations and harm in this area and are 
said to be constantly adapting in order to accommodate changes in modes of 
communication and society. Richardson considers the way that decisions 
involving celebrities (eg Theakston v MGN 
8
 and A v B Plc 
9
) would initially 
appear to favour the feminist cause by refusing injunctions against sexual 
disclosure, thus protecting the right of women in transitory relationships to 
profit from the sharing of ‘their’ information about the liaison. This leads her 
to analyse the impact upon notions of secrecy in intimate relationships the 
thinking of Charles Fried who describes an atomistic ‘property in the person’, 
and the similar, but more complex, position of Kant that the person should 
never be treated only as an end, but never as the means by which to perform 
an immoral act (eg that of disclosure). Richardson concludes that neither 
theory is adequate to deal with the fact that not only motivations, but also the 
nature of the harm must be considered by the courts in determining cases, and 
that the latter will be, to some extent, determined by the victim’s perception of 
the former.  
Thus, differing male motivations remains key for Richardson, some of 
which are revenge through humiliation (‘revenge porn’) and apparent macho 
bonding, as in the recounted criminal case in which a cadet at the Australian 
Defence Force Academy relayed in real time a sexual encounter with a female 
cadet to six male cadets in a nearby room.
10
 Richardson does not do justice to 
her argument when she fails to substantiate her assertion that, ‘While there 
may be cases of men attempting to make money from disclosure and women 
motivated by revenge or more complex desires, it is the men in the case law 
who demonstrate these potentially darker desires’. She simply writes that 
these dark desires are indicated by the sexual double standards men use to 
humiliate women with ‘revenge porn’. There is a relatively brief mention of 
‘sexting’, which is said to be often created by girls and then used as a means 
of betrayal by the recipient boys. But aside from recommending that it must 
be sensitively regulated, not much more is done with this complex and 
contradictory phenomenon to promote the feminist thesis on privacy. 
Richardson believes that feminism must reconcile two apparently conflicting 
positions: the first rejects conceptions of privacy which protect violence 
which is hidden away in the home while the second, in which guards aspects 
of intimacy which are not for public consumption. Other aspects of the 
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problem she considers are definitions of public interest, psychiatric injury and 
the general revolution in the ‘infosphere’.  
Richardson acknowledges that the feminist discourse favours analyses of 
privacy which give priority to the relational rather than individualistic or 
atomistic concerns. She approves the recognition by the ECtHR that one 
aspect of art 8 privacy protection is ‘the right to develop relationships with 
other human beings and the outside world…’11 It would be interesting to 
construct a feminist response to the recent case of AAA v Associated 
Newspapers
12
 where an injunction application on behalf of a child to prevent 
revelations about her paternity was denied on the basis of her own mother’s 
earlier ambivalent attitude to the disclosure of this information. The relational 
doesn’t always advantage the female or the vulnerable.  
The next two chapters deal with the dubious utility of civil law actions for 
sexual wrongs. Nikki Godden, in ‘Tort Claims for Rape: More Trials, Fewer 
Tribulations?’ begins with the observation that tort claims for rape are 
relatively rare and then features as case studies, three that have been 
successfully brought (against relatively wealthy defendants), considering 
whether there are strategic reasons for encouraging greater use of civil law 
remedies by victims of sexual wrongs for egalitarian ends. The issue of 
consent, though challenged historically by feminists, has been interpreted to 
the claimant’s benefit in the few civil cases that have been examined. But case 
law does not reveal the reality of power, trust, and hierarchy and the use of 
sexual history evidence illustrates the way in which in civil law, as well as the 
criminal, stereotypes and misogynistic assumptions undermine complainants’ 
worth and autonomy. She believes, however, in an increase in judicial 
awareness of social consequences of rape as well as psychological and lost 
economic opportunity. There shouldn’t be an assumption that the purpose of 
bringing tort claims is measured purely by the quantum of the damages award; 
also relevant are vindication, punishment, and ‘legal validation’. Godden 
concludes that things are generally improving in civil claims for rape, while 
recognising that it is a wrong which generally is generally committed with 
impunity. 
A chapter which is one of the most comprehensive and ultimately 
satisfying is ‘Sexual Wrongdoing: Do Remedies Reflect the Wrong?’ by 
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey. She melds an imaginative critical analysis of the way 
harm is viewed generally in the tort system with the fact that the sexual 
wrong-doer often targets the most vulnerable in society, not only on the basis 
of gender but also age and lack socio-economic or political power. In a similar 
vein to Priaulx, Adjin-Tettey recognises that intangible losses, as opposed to 
the bodily or financial, are less likely to be recognised and compensated by 
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the tort system. She asserts that harm is socially constructed and that Western 
thought’s endorsement of a dualism: mind/body or reason/emotion, has 
disadvantaged women, who are traditionally associated with the latter. Bodily 
integrity is protected as a tangible property right whereas the less visible 
aspects of autonomy, breached in sexual wrong-doing, tend not to be accorded 
legal legitimacy. Having explored what she calls ‘commodification anxiety’ 
and the ‘corruptibility’ of intangible interests, she concludes that when 
compensation is inadequate, victims will be deterred from seeking justice 
through the tort system. Victims, already on the margins of society, are further 
marginalised. Adjin-Tettey makes the case for an enhanced state funding of 
compensation to such victims, thereby removing redress for sexual wrongs 
from the ‘private sector’ (the legal system) and placing it in the sphere of 
social responsibility. 
Lastly, comes the amusingly titled ‘Damages Stereotypes: the Return of 
‘Hoovering as a Hobby’ by Regina Graycar. Personal injury damages 
assessment might appear to be gender-neutral but closer inspection reveals the 
effect of entrenched assumptions about women’s roles in the workplace and 
the home. Depressingly, it is often the case that calculations for loss of future 
earnings are based upon actuarial data for the average female wage, rather 
than the (higher) combined male/female wage; a policy which assumes the 
indefinite continuation of existing inequalities. Courts are adhering to 
antiquated stereotypes, when they hold that a woman’s loss of capacity to do 
domestic work is actionable only either by her husband in an action for loss of 
consortium, or personally under the non-pecuniary heading. By treating it as 
loss of amenity, much of the work that women do is thus is devalued by being 
equated with recreational activities. More significantly, the law condones and 
perpetuates a failure to recognise the considerable economic value much of 
the work done by women.  
‘Brainstorming’ is a term used to describe their task by more than one of 
the authors in this collection and the reader engaging with this book is 
provoked by a multitude of ideas and questions to be further pursued. As with 
all worthwhile critical interrogations of the law, ‘normative underpinnings’ 
are exposed and boundaries of categories and concepts challenged. Some 
contributions are more essentially feminist than others, and indeed the editors 
in their introduction observe that many of the legal reforms advocated in the 
collection are not part of a ‘zero sum game in which men lose if women gain’. 
The more convincing arguments note that in many cases of injustice gender 
may not be the only operative determinant, but more broadly the vulnerability 
or lack of power in those who are poorly served by the law. Priaulx asks what 
extensions to the operation of negligence might do for humanity (her italics). 
Adjin-Tettey admonishes that victims must be listened to in their own words 




The editors reflect on the dilemma that when recommending tort reform, 
some can be said to be ‘buying into’ the existing discourse of the legal 
system, rather than taking a more objective and thus radical stance, as does for 
example Adjin-Tettey. A more pervasive dilemma in feminism is that many 
arguments are dependent upon treating the default state of the female as 
lacking power, status and victimhood, although this can be a reality, even in 
the relatively privileged sectors of society covered by common law legal 
systems. At the same time, as some authors point out, the situation is 
improving and the pitfall of Graycar’s judges who assume the future will not 
see further change, must be avoided. 
The diversity of tort itself necessarily requires the juxtaposition of very 
disparate types of wrong and of damage: eg the disruption of a population’s 
sex ratio due to toxic pollution in the wilds of Canada as compared to the very 
different indignities of ‘sexting’. Its wide scope gives this collection both its 
spice but some of its drawbacks. It is important for cohesion that the 
contributions should be linked by a strong thread: here, of feminism. In some 
instances, this thread is stretched rather thin. Miola’s effort to fit his otherwise 
strong piece on the standard of care in negligence into the feminist mold 
seems contrived. More disquieting is Richardson’s unsupported assertion that 
it is only the male perpetrators of ‘revenge porn’ who somehow demonstrate 
‘darker desires’. This does a disservice to her otherwise impressive analysis. 
No student of medical law will forget the quietly revolutionary speech by 
Lady Justice Hale in Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital 
NHS Trust,
13
 in which she explicitly addressed the issue of damages for 
unwanted pregnancy from the female perspective. This was surely the first 
time a senior judge had recounted the reality of childbirth and motherhood 
from personal experience. Richardson and Rackley’s collection of feminist 
scholarship makes a significant contribution, not only to ‘disclosing and 
dislodging’ the gendered norms at work in tort law, but to providing ‘an 
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